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Medical Malpractice and the Ameri-
can Jury: Confronting the Myths
about Jury Incompetence, Deep
Pockets, and Outrageous Damage
Awards, by Neil Vidmar. University
of Michigan Press. 839 Greene
Street, Ann Arbor, Mich. 48106.
(313) 764-4388. 1995. 336 pages.
$37.50. $19.95, paper.
T he story of The Medical Malprac-
tice Trial has a place in popular
American legal culture, somewhere
on the shelf with Killers Who Got Off
on Technicalities. The plot is simple
and tragic. The protagonist is the
Doctor, a good man with a flaw: He
tries too hard. In the process, he
makes an innocent mistake or be-
lieves he can prevent the unpre-
ventable. In any event, he fails and
the Patient dies or is permanently in-
jured. For this unintentional error
the Doctor is crucified, by the venge-
ful anger of the Patient or her survi-
vors, the avarice of the plaintiffs' law-
yer, the smooth deceit of the
plaintiffs' experts, and the ignorance
of the jury.
The jury is central to this tragedy.
It is the audience to whom the other
furies play, so its vices are critical. A
full account of its failings would read
something like this: The jurors enter
the case blinded by emotion-sympa-
thy for the injured plaintiff, antipa-
thy to the elitist professional defen-
dant; they are too dumb to make
heads or tails of the medical issues at
stake; they are easily manipulated by
the machiavellian plaintiffs' lawyer
and his quack witnesses; they find the
defendant liable on flimsy if not
fraudulent evidence that no knowl-
edgeable expert would believe; they
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assume the defendant Doctor is rich
so they award excessive, outrageous
damages, primarily for will-o-the-wisp
"pain and suffering;" and then add
vast, unjustified punitive damages.
This is not our only image of medi-
cal malpractice trials. In the movie
The Verdict, for example, the hero
(Paul Newman) is a down-at-the-
heels malpractice plaintiffs' attorney
who is aided by an itinerant good-Sa-
maritan expert witness, and the vil-
lains are the chief defense attorney
and the doctor defendant. Still, the
vision of medical malpractice litiga-
tion as the persecution of innocent
doctors by greedy lawyers and incom-
petent jurors has gained a great deal
of currency. But, as Neil Vidmar con-
vincingly argues in Medical Malprac-
tice and the American Jury, almost every
element of this story is false.
Vidmar, a professor of social sci-
ence at Duke Law School and a pro-
fessor of psychology at Duke Univer-
sity, is a prolific student of jury
behavior and a long-time defender of
the jury as an institution. In this
work, his expertise in social scientific
research serves his argument well.
Based on his own studies of medical
malpractice litigation in North Caro-
lina, and on an extensive body of re-
search by others, Vidmar counters
common stereotypes with facts:
ejuries in medical malpractice
cases are not biased in favor of
plaintiffs in any obvious way. The
great majority of malpractice tri-
als-two-thirds to three-quarters, by
most estimates-end with defense
verdicts, and jurors often express
sympathy and concern for the de-
fendants even in cases in which they
find for the plaintiffs.
* jurors do not simply accept the
claims of the expert witnesses. They
do their best to understand, interpret
and evaluate expert testimony and
are quite sensitive to motivations and
possible biases.
9 Medical malpractice juries are
not irrational, arbitrary, or lawless.
Studies have found that malpractice
jury verdicts are generally consistent
with the judgments of judges and of
non-partisan medical experts.
- Malpractice juries do not award
vast unjustified damages. Most medi-
cal malpractice verdicts are compara-
tively modest, and the occasional
mega-verdicts are usually under-
standable. There is a great deal of
unexplained variation in the size of
jury awards, but the variation paral-
lels that in settlements and judg-
ments by judges.
e Most of the damages in medical
malpractice verdicts are for out-of-
pocket costs-primarily expensive
long-term medical care-and for
economic losses. Non-economic pain
and suffering damages seem to be a
minor component. There is no sys-
tematic evidence that juries give
higher damages for the same injuries
in medical malpractice cases than in
other tort cases, or that they penalize
doctors because they believe that
doctors are rich.
* Finally, punitive damages are es-
sentially a non-issue. They are rarely
awarded in medical malpractice tri-
als-1 percent of all cases is a plau-
sible estimate of the frequency of
punitive damages-and usually in
comparatively small amounts.
Many of these findings are not new
to scholars in the field. But they are
new to most people, including many
lawyers and judges, and they are fre-
quently ignored by writers and schol-
ars. As Vidmar points out, medical
malpractice law has been controver-
sial for a long time. Cases discussing
the "conspiracy of silence" among
physicians to protect their own go
back 50 years or more, and Vidmar
cites articles from the 1840s and
1850s charging that litigation was
forcing doctors to abandon their call-
ing. But in the past 20 years, the pub-
lic debate over medical malpractice
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has become particularly shrill.
Vidmar does not assume that the
reader has any particular background
in medicine, law, social science, or sta-
tistics. Instead, he explains issues in
interesting and simple terms and in-
cludes a selection of readable and il-
luminating stories. Vidmar has suc-
ceeded in producing a general
treatment of the role of the malprac-
tice jury that is accessible to any inter-
ested reader-not an easy task.
Praising juries
Vidmar is a self-proclaimed fan ofju-
ries, and his praise of the accuracy of
jury trials may go too far. For ex-
ample, in discussing the use and
evaluation of expert witnesses, he
sometimes seems to be attacking
straw men:
[T]he case studies help make the point
that we must seriously question the claim
that plaintiffs always use 'hired gun' ex-
perts who will testify to anything for a fee
and that jurors will uncritically accept
that testimony. (p. 157)
Granted. And granted that experts
who "get caught up in the adversary
process and go out on a limb" some-
times find that that "the limb gets
sawed off in cross examination," and
also that defendants and their ex-
perts occasionally show some disin-
genuousness. But at the end of the
day, does that mean the process is ac-
curate? Even if all the witnesses who
testify are as honest as they know how
to be, our system of selecting and pre-
paring expert witnesses is likely to
produce as polar a display of opin-
ions as possible. And the same adver-
sarial buzz saw that lops off implau-
sible limbs can and does destroy
competent well-rooted trees.
Vidmar points to research that
shows a positive correlation between
jury verdicts and expert evaluations
of malpractice cases, but this is only
equivocal evidence of jury accuracy.
The decision on liability in a medical
malpractice case has two compo-
nents: (1) Did the defendant doctor
violate the standard of care in treat-
ing the plaintiff patient? (2) If so, did
that violation cause the defendant's
injuries? The first question is norma-
tive. The norms that are encom-
passed by the standard of care only
apply to physicians, but even so it
might make sense to let juries be the
final arbiters of what type of practice
is expected of doctors. One way or
the other, the statement that a par-
ticular type of conduct is required by
the standard of care is true only be-
cause it is supported by some group's
consensus-doctors, lawyers, judges,
or jurors.
Causation, however, is a factual
question, and often a very difficult
one. If a baby is born with cerebral
palsy, the only issue at a malpractice
trial may be: Was that condition
caused by the obstetrician's failure to
perform an emergency cesarian sec-
tion despite signs of fetal distress, or
would it have occurred anyway? In
the usual case, there is no way to
know for sure-and no way to tell, af-
ter the fact, if the jury (or any other
decision maker) was right or wrong.
On the other hand, on a similar is-
sue-whether a mother's use of the
drug Bendectin caused her baby's
birth defect-we know quite a bit,
and the evidence overwhelmingly
shows that Bendectin does not cause
birth defects. And yet in the some 22
jury trials of Bendectin cases, the ju-
ries got it wrong 36 percent of the
time, and that despite much clearer
and more one-sided scientific evi-
dence than they would ever have
seen in a birth-trauma malpractice
case. The result of the Bendectin
cases are consistent with a positive
correlation between jury verdicts and
actual liability-the juries were right
64 percent of the time-but this is
hardly an encouraging result.
I agree with Vidmar that there is
no reason to believe that judges
would do any better than juries. But
comparative claims-that malprac-
tice juries are no worse than judges,
that they are often in agreement with
doctors-are weak praise. They re-
fute some strong and misplaced criti-
cisms of malpractice jury trials but do
not amount to an affirmative argu-
ment that jury decision making is
better because it's more accurate.
The legal context
Vidmar is careful to point out that his
book "is about medical malpractice
juries, not about the whole tort litiga-
tion system for medical malpractice."
Nonetheless, he does address this
broader question because, as he rec-
ognizes, "jury outcomes cannot be
understood independently of the dy-
namics of the litigation process and
the mass of cases from which the jury
trials arise." This part of the book,
however, suffers from significant
omissions. For example, one of the
major studies in the area is the
Harvard Medical Malpractice Study.
Vidmar refers to this study repeat-
edly, but he does not mention its
finding that actual negligence by the
physician bore little relation to the
patient's decision to file a law suit.
That finding-like the recently pub-
lished finding from the same source
that damage payments to malpractice
plaintiffs were unrelated to negli-
gence-does not speak directly to
jury decision making. But it does say
a great deal about the context of
filed, dismissed, and settled cases in
which jury trials occur.
Vidmar discusses the literature on
the process by which litigated dis-
putes are selected for trial, but he
does not entirely do it justice. For ex-
ample, in trying to explain the fact
that plaintiffs lose 65 percent to 80
percent of malpractice trials, Vidmar
pooh-poohs the "portfolio" theory:
that plaintiff attorneys are willing to
absorb 3 or 4 loses for every win,
since the payoffs in the winning cases
greatly exceed their costs in the los-
ers. In the next paragraph he offers
his own theory:
Sometimes plaintiff attorneys may realize
late in the game that the case is weak, but
so much time, money and effort have al-
ready been expended that they decide to
go to trial anyway.. .to'roll the dice,' that
is take a chance that the jury will see
things their way.
I think it's fair to assume that a
lawyer's decision to roll the dice on a
long shot is based on an assessment
that the possible gain is much greater
than the likely additional costs. If so,
Vidmar's theory is simply a variant of
the portfolio theory that he rejected
directly above it.
Of all the defects of our system of
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litigating medical malpractice claims,
perhaps the worst is the high cost of
the process. Vidmar points out that
most malpractice lawyers he spoke to
in North Carolina said that because
of high costs they will rarely, if ever,
take a case in which the expected
damage award is under $100,000;
others report similar practices else-
where. Vidmar recognizes that "mal-
practice trials are painful and expen-
sive" and best avoided, if possible. I
think he underestimates the prob-
lem. Nationally, about 7 to 10 percent
of medical malpractice law suits go to
jury trial. By contrast, as best we can
tell, fewer than 1 percent of filed au-
tomobile accident law suits go to
trial, and a higher proportion of
claims are settled without a com-
plaint ever being filed in the first
place. It's not just the trials them-
selves; in medical malpractice litiga-
tion, almost every case is investigated
and prepared and defended as if it
might go to trial, and that drives up
costs heavily. Whatever the causes,
the outcome is shocking: a system in
which potentially compensable inju-
ries are ignored because the damages
are a mere $99,000.
This book should be read by every
student of medical malpractice. Pro-
fessor Vidmar does a good job of de-
fending malpractice juries against
the charge that they provide cheap,
debased justice. In the process, how-
ever, he adds evidence to what may
be a more serious indictment: that
medical malpractice jury trials are a
luxury that we cannot afford. V
SAMUEL GROSS is a professor at the Uni-
versity of Michigan Law School.
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